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The idea of discourse in poststructuralism:
Derrida, Lacan and Foucault
In recent decades the idea of “discourse” has become, increasingly popular. It is be-
ing applied in many contexts and research disciplines often without precisely deﬁ ning 
its scope and meaning. The case is made additionally difﬁ cult by commonsense con-
notations which ascribe to discourse the meaning of an “organized discussion”. This 
notion is presently used in psychology, sociology, pedagogy, philosophy, anthropology, 
linguistics and other disciplines of the social sciences in such different contexts and 
meanings that the formulation of a clear and conclusive deﬁ niton that would satisfy all 
its users seems to be an impossible task. 
Ernesto Laclau, who placed the notion of discourse on the general map of the con-
temporary political philosophy, ranks it among the phenomena which came to promi-
nence as a result of what one could call the transcendental turn in modern philosophy 
entailing the type of analysis which is primarily addressed not to facts but to their 
conditions of possibility (Laclau 1995, p. 541). The discursive analysis is based on the 
assumption that every human thought, perception or activity depends on the structura-
tion of the ﬁ eld of signiﬁ cation which precedes the immediacy of the facts. According 
to Laclau, this approach differs from the Kantian reﬂ ection on the a priori forms of 
human cognition and also from the phenomenological recognition of the subject as the 
ultimate vehicle of meaning. In his opinion, the theorists of discourse assume a rigor-
ously historical character of the “discursive a priori forms” and they propose to exam-
ine it with the use of the categories generated within de Saussure’s theory of the sign. 
Such scholars, Laclau argues, use an idea of structure that largely ignores the role of the 
subject in the process of the constitution of sense.
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 In their book devoted to the analysis of discourse Louise J. Philips and Marianne 
Jørgensen offer the general deﬁ nition of discourse as “a particular way of talking about 
and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Philips & Jørgensen 2002, 
p. 1). The authors go on to emphasize that the shared element of all the “analyses of 
discourse” is that our ways of talking do not neutrally reﬂ ect the world but rather play 
an active role in creating and changing it. Acknowledging this determined “social con-
structivism”, the authors outline three main ﬁ elds of “the discourse analysis”: Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantall Mouffe’s discourse theory, Norman Fairclogh’s critical discourse 
analysis and discursive psychology (e.g. Potter and Wetherell 1987).
The aim of this paper is to trace the historical evolution of the notion of discourse, 
beginning from de Saussure’s concept of the sign, and to consider closely three post-
sructuralist theories of discourse as present in Derrida, Lacan and Foucault which have 
cleared the way for contemporary approaches to this problem. I will attempt to show 
that a more detailed analysis of the conceptions of discourse in post-structuralism in-
dicates that as early as at their beginnings there appeared some essential differences in 
understanding this phenomenon which challenges the thesis on the existence of a con-
sistent reﬂ ection that could be referred to as the theory or analysis of discourse. It can 
be assumed though, that these differences are somewhat “natural”, given the interdis-
ciplinarity of what has come to be called “post-structuralism”. Naturally, discourse 
considered in the context of an analysis of the structures of human unconsciousness 
(Lacan) is not the same idea of discourse that we can use to analyse the structures 
of power (Foucault). However, the aims which guide the individual theorists in their 
examinations of discourse often differently inﬂ uence their theoretical resolutions and 
the speciﬁ c terminologies which rarely allow themselves to be reconciled with the 
propositions of other scholars. “The discourse theory” thus constitutes a heterogenic 
ﬁ eld of “kin” conceptions conjoined by an emphasis put on the constructivist power 
of language. In this approach it is assumed that language creates social reality (in the 
weaker version it is assumed that language is the condition of our capability to know 
social reality) although the relation between discourse and the social world may take 
different forms in individual propositions. In Derrida the idea of discourse serves as 
a model for the “deconstructionist” reading of texts whereby the notion of the “center” 
is marginalized. In Lacan discourse is associated with the social through the individual 
and, in addition, it is as ungraspable as the unconscious layers of the human mind. For 
Foucault the main problem seems to lie in determining the status of what is called “the 
human sciences” as a form of knowledge whereby the question of the functioning of 
language intertwines with questions concerning its relations with the social and institu-
tional environment that governs the production of statements in a given time and place.
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De Saussure and his critics
In a series of lectures entitled Course in General Linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure 
divided the sign into its signifying (acoustic image, signiﬁ ant) and signiﬁ ed (the idea, 
signiﬁ é) components. In this way he rejected the referential conception of language 
that was based on the distinctive thing-name. De Saussure assumes that the link be-
tween signiﬁ ant and signiﬁ é is arbitrary (de Saussure 1986, p. 67). The signiﬁ ed has no 
ﬁ xed, signifying element ascribed to it, therefore no idea can assume a pre-determined 
acoustic image. An idea, claims Saussure, can be compared to a value which in itself is 
something completely arbitrary.
Ferdinad de Saussure developed an interesting analogy which compared the sys-
tem of language to playing chess. For example, the chesspiece knight that is outside 
the chessboard and the determined conditions of the game, has no value in the eyes 
of the player. It becomes a concrete and real element only within the game wherein it 
enters relations with the other ﬁ gures. It then acquires value. Now, let us suppose that 
during the game the chesspiece gets lost or damaged: can it be replaced with another 
one? Certainly, and moreover, a totally different, dissimilar ﬁ gure will serve exactly the 
same purpose, because its value largely depends on what surrounds it. Thus de Saus-
sure writes: 
In the language itself, there are only differences. Even more important than that is 
the fact that although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between 
which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, and no posi-
tive terms. Whether we take the signiﬁ cation or the signal, the language includes 
neither ideas nor sounds existing prior to the linguistic system, but only conceptual 
and phonetic differences arising out of that system (de Saussure 1986, p. 118). 
The signiﬁ er and the signiﬁ ed, considered individually, have only a differentiating 
and negative character and it is only their conjunction that transforms them into some-
thing “positive”.
A chesspiece has no positive meaning except for the one it acquires during the 
game. Likewise, a linguistic sign looses its meaning if we consider it in separation 
from the other elements of the language system. What happens in language is not deter-
mined by that which is non-linguistic. One could say that langauge “articulates” reality 
in some way, however this process also remains totally arbitrary. Consequently, not 
only is it the link between a concept and its acoustic image that constitutes its linguis-
tic articualtion arbitrarily, but also no ﬁ xed connection exists between a concept and 
a non-linguistic thing it refers to. We are able to know real objects, but only insofar as 
our language allows us to. I want to emphasize here that de Saussure accepts that there 
is an ultimate isomorphism between the order of signiﬁ cation and the order of being 
signiﬁ ed. Every series of sounds corresponds to exactly one concept which means that 
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it is possible to determine at any moment how in a given language system a signiﬁ er 
relates to a signiﬁ ed. It is also worth noting that from the very beginning de Saussure 
emphasized the social character of language (langue) (ibid., p. 74). While our language 
(parole) may be shaped individually, its practical application may occur only due to the 
fact that language is a convention agreed upon by a social group.
There have been many criticisms levelled at de Saussure’s theory of the sign, one 
of detractions states that if language is only a form, not substance, and if there exists 
a close isomorphism between the order of signiﬁ cation and the order of being signiﬁ ed, 
then from the formal point of view both orders become indistinguishable and so it is 
impossible to maintain that the character of the linguistic sign is dualistic. Hence the 
so-called glossematic school of Copenhagen has proposed to renounce the Saussurian 
conception of isomorphism and substitute it with the idea of the division of both orders 
into units that are smaller than signs: 
Phonologists have brought to light linguistic units smaller than signs: the phonemes 
(the sign calf is made up of three phonemes k/ae and /f/. The same method applied 
to content allows the distinction, in the same sign, of at least three elements (…) 
or semes (…) bovine/male/young. Now it is clear that the semantic and the phonic 
units thus located can be distinguished from the formal point of view: the combina-
torial laws concerning the phonemes of a language and those applied to the semes 
cannot be shown to correspond to each other (…) (Ducrot & Todorov 1979, p. 22, 
quoted in Laclau 1995, pp. 542-543).
The break with the Saussurian tradition of understanding the linguistic sign had an 
important consequence for the succeeding theories of discourse. If one assumes that the 
abstract system of rules described by phonologists does not require any particular sub-
stance, it follows then that by the means of these rules one can describe any signifying 
system operating in a society, be it nutrition, structures of kinship, furniture or fashion. 
From this supposition the way leads directly to the renunciation of any substantial 
differences between linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena which is precisely what 
E. Laclau and Ch. Mouffe do in their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. In this way the 
phenomenological thesis on the crucial role of the subject in the constitution of sense 
is also dismissed. 
Derrida and deconstruction
Another point criticized in de Saussure’s theory was his usage of the term “sys-
tem” understood as a closed totality that somehow organizes language. This problem is 
closely linked with the aforementioned critique of de Saussure’s idea of isomorphism. 
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de Saussure says that: “language is both a self-contained whole and the principle of 
classiﬁ cation” (1986, p. 10) and later on that: 
A linguistic system is a series of phonetic differences matched with a series of con-
ceptual differences. But this matching of a certain number of auditory signals and 
a similar number of items carved out of the mass of thought gives rise to a system 
of values. It is this system which provides the operative bond between phonic and 
mental elements within each sign (ibid., p. 118). 
Now, in the works of the classic structuralists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Ro-
land Barthes, de Saussure’s idea/theory of “system” has been modiﬁ ed into the idea/
theory of “structure”1. Thus it can be argued that the post-structuralist critique of struc-
turalism and the theory of structure is also aimed at the idea of the “totality” and “clo-
sure” implied in de Saussure’s system. According to Derrida, “the notion of structure 
refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the order of forms and sites. 
Structure is ﬁ rst the structure of an organic or artiﬁ cial work, the internal unity of an as-
semblage (…) governed by a uniﬁ ed principle” (Derrida 2001, p. 17). Thus construed, 
structure becomes yet another name for a construction or an architectonic form whose 
internal order is determined by the existence of a privileged center. This conception, as 
Rodolphe Gasché has argued (1986, pp. 144-145), faces two major problems. The ﬁ rst 
one, connected with the closure of structure, consists in the recognition that the pas-
sage from one structure to another may only take place by way of a catastrophe or pure 
chance. The second one, linked with the existence of the center, concerns the change 
which may effectuate within a structure: it will always be the result of its internal logic. 
The fusion of these two topics clearly points to the contradictory nature of the idea of 
the structure and calls for its deconstruction, as Derrida tells us.
In the Letter to a Japanese Friend Derrida states that deconstruction is not a demo-
lition, nor is it an analysis or a critique. It is not dismantling and destruction. In “itself” 
deconstruction is nothing in the sense that all attempts to predicate deconstruction are 
doomed to failure. That is why it needs to be understood as that which takes place 
“where there is something” (Derrida 1988a, p. 4). Taking into the account Derrida’s 
contention that “there is nothing outside the text”, deconstruction can be conceived 
of as textual labour in the form of a double reading. The ﬁ rst reading is a faitful at-
tempt to follow the dominant interpretation of the text, its assumptions, concepts and 
arguments. The second reading consists in tracing its excluded, repressed and inferior 
interpretation that forms an undercurrent in the text. Establishing the textual hierarchy 
1  Lévi-Strauss conﬁ ded to having feelings of “envy” and “melancholy” at the success linguistics had 
achieved presumably in comparison with ethnology. Let us quote his opinion on the phonological method 
and the idea of “system” which were to become the pattern for him to follow: “in the ﬁ rst place” – he writes 
–“phonology passes from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to that of their underlying uncon-
scious structure; it refuses to take terms as independent entities, on the contrary, in takes relations between 
terms as the basis of its analyses; it introduces the notion of system (…); ﬁ nally, it aims at the discovery of 
general laws either found by induction or deduced logically” (Lévi-Strauss 1963, p. 33). 
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of two interpretations can demonstrate that the dominant interpretation is dependent on 
what it excludes. Consequently, the relation between the two interpretations becomes 
more important than the dominant intepretation. Derrida argues that it is so because of 
the supplementary character of the second interpretation which ﬁ lls in the original lack 
in the dominant one. However, deconstruction is not content with a simple reversal of 
textual hierarchies of intepretations by privileging the supressed one over the dominant 
one, but “seeks to account for the undecidable oscillation between the different textual 
strategies that the inscription of a metaphysical hierarchy must necessarily presuppose” 
(Torﬁ ng 1999, p. 66). 
The idea of “undecidability” is one of the more important aspects of the deconstruc-
tive “analysis”. The existence of the “undecidables” in language that are “false units 
of sense” attests, according to Derrida, “to the fact that no interpretation can claim to 
be the dominant one”. However, “undecidability” – argues Derrida – has nothing to do 
with “indterminacy”: 
undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for exam-
ple, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly de-
termined in strictly deﬁ ned situations (for example, discursive-syntactical or rhe-
torical but also political, ethical, etc.). They are pragmatically determined (Derrida 
1988b, p. 148).
It can be argued that deconstruction is a strategic intervention into metaphysics 
whereby an attempt is made to confront metaphysics with its “other”. Metaphysics 
manifests itself in a series of philosophical ideas based on the category of the “center”, 
“ultimate ground” or “source” such as eidos, arche, telos, transcendental, conscious-
ness, God and man whose task is to determine Being as “fully present”. In Writing and 
Difference Derrida argues that the fully present center governs the structuration of the 
structure but itself evades the process of structuration. It follows then, that the center 
has somehow to be located both within and outside the structure. The source of this 
paradox, as Derrida puts it, lies in the “power of desire” to lessen the feeling of insecu-
rity that accompanies a certain way of being inscribed in the process of structuration. 
This never fulﬁ lled desire brings about numerous displacements and replacements of 
the idea of the center. As a consequence we never deal with its full presence but only 
with its substitutes. Therefore, one is led to think rather of the “absence of the center” 
or a blank space opened for other substitutions. As Derrida concludes: “in the absence 
of a center or origin, everything became discourse” (Derrida 2001, p. 354). Discourse is 
conceived here as a system of differences within which the play of signiﬁ cation extends 
inﬁ nitely in the absence of the transcendental signiﬁ ed.
In light of this argument the point of Derrida’s attack on the idea of the structure’s 
“closure” becomes clearer. The closure of the structure is the result of an effort to “to-
talize” and exhaust the ﬁ eld of identity leaving no space for that which may enter it 
from the outside. This idea can easily be challenged from the empirical point of view 
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refering to the inﬁ nite richness of the reality which cannot be bound into one, ﬁ nite and 
cohesive discourse. It can also, as Derrida argues, be criticized from the point of view 
of a free play of signiﬁ cation: 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the inﬁ niteness of a ﬁ eld 
cannot be covered by a ﬁ nite glance or a ﬁ nite discourse, but because the nature of 
the ﬁ eld – that is, language and the ﬁ nite language – excludes totalization. This ﬁ eld 
is in effect that of play, that is to say, a ﬁ eld of inﬁ nite substitutions only because it 
is ﬁ nite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible, as in the classical 
hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something mising from it: a center 
which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions (ibid., p. 365).
In other words, the impossibility of totalization or closure results from there being 
no determined center which in turn extends the process of signiﬁ cation ad inﬁ nitum. 
Thus understood structure becomes a ﬁ eld of signiﬁ cation in which a temporary order 
is established by the presence of many mutually substituting centers. This establish-
ment of a relative structural order is conditioned by the exclusion of the “constitutive 
outside” that threatens the order of the structure and prevents its ultimate closure (see 
Torﬁ ng 1999, p. 86).
Lacan and the discursive foundation of subjectivity
Another important thinker on the historical map of the discourse theory is Jacques 
Lacan in whose works the problems of discourse are inextricably connected with the 
reﬂ ection on the nature of human subjectivity. As Marshall W. Alcorn observes, there 
are two ways of interpreting the relation between subjectivity and discourse in Lacan. 
The ﬁ rst interpretation – the post-structuralist one – regards subjectivity as dependent 
on discourse and puts emphasis on the examination of the discursive systems in which 
it is involved, claiming that they play an essential role in the constitution of the sub-
ject’s identity. The second interpretation, appreciating Lacan’s psychoanalytical prac-
tice, contradicts the post-structuralist stance and asserts that it is the subject – construed 
in opposition to the essentialist philosophical tradition – that plays the essential role in 
the constitution of the discursive system. Alcorn argues that in the end both lines of 
interpretation are legitimate: 
In some respects Lacan’s account of the subject follows the lines of a rhetorical 
analysis. Lacan is interested in ﬁ gures of speech and how speech, creating sys-
tems of desire and identiﬁ cation, moves the subject. On the one hand, this analysis 
is highly theoretical: Lacan is fully engaged in all the conceptual resources for-
mulated by post-sructuralist thought. But on the other hand, Lacan’s analysis is 
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highly practical. As an analyst, Lacan confronted subjects who resisted, denied and 
displaced linguistic effects. This forced him to formulate a description of a sub-
ject much more active and resistant than the subject imagined by post-structuralist 
thought (Alcorn 1994, p. 29).
Mark Bracher explains the Lacanian conception of discourse as follows: 
Discourse, Lacan emphasizes, is a necessary structure that subsists in certain fun-
damental relations and thus conditions every speech act and the rest of our behav-
ior and action as well. These fundamental relations are of several different orders: 
intrasubjective or psychological relations, intersubjective or social relations, and 
relations with the nonhuman world. Discourse, according to Lacan, plays formative 
and transformative roles in each of these orders (Bracher 1994b, p. 107). 
Lacan argues that the constitutive role of discourse in our relations with the external 
world is perhaps most visible in the example of science. Science involves not a better 
understanding of the world but rather the construction of realities that we previously 
had no awareness of. What science constructs is not just a new model of the world, but 
a world in which there are new phenomena. Furthermore, this constructed world occurs 
solely through the play of a logical truth, a strict combinatory: the system of signiﬁ ers 
that constitutes scientiﬁ c knowledge (see ibid., p. 108). Discourse is similarily constitu-
tive of the social order which is the consequence of a more general assumption that “it 
is on discourse that every determination of the subject depends” (Lacan 1991, p. 178, 
quoted in Bracher 1994b, p. 108) including thought, affect, enjoyment and one’s sense 
of life.
J. Lacan often emhasized how important Freud’s discovery of the unconscious was 
for modern psychology and philosophy. The discovery turned out to be more radical 
in consequences than the Copernican or Darwinian revolution in that the latter ones 
have maintained the belief in the identity of human subjectivity and the conscious ego. 
Psychoanalysis, says Lacan, is “at odds with any philosophy directly stemming from 
the cogito” (Lacan 2006, p. 93) and thus objects to linking ego to cogito. Developing 
and partly modifying Freud’s theory particularly by accentuating the role of language 
in the organization of the unconscious, Lacan formulates his theory on the grounds of 
the idea of three orders: the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic which remain in 
“circular interdependence”. 
One of the possible points of departure in outlining Lacan’s theory of subjectivity 
and discourse – one that proves quite helpful in explaining the meaning of the three 
“orders” – is the analysis of the experience of the child undergoing the so-called mir-
ror stage (6-18 month of life). The moment the child joyfully recognizes its image in 
the mirror is of paramount importance for the later development of its identity. Prior to 
this experience the child’s self does not exist as a separate entity. It is only by way of 
perceiving and identifying itself with the mirror image that the child recognizes itself 
as a functionate, separate whole or, in other words, acquires identity and unity. This 
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experience is naturally disturbed later on by the child’s realization of the distance that 
separates it from the imaginary wholeness represented by the mirror self. The mirror 
reﬂ ection remains something alien, reversed, magniﬁ ed, reduced or deformed which 
increases the actual feeling of fragmentation and lack of coordination of the child’s 
body and proves further that it cannot be reconciled with the imaginary unity. Stavraka-
kis is correct to say that “the ego, the image in which we recognise ourselves, is always 
an alien alter ego” (Stavrakakis 1999, p. 18). Lacan emphasizes this ambiguity of the 
imaginary resulting from the child’s constructing its identity on the grounds of what 
he or she is not, that means – its “other”. “The ambiguity of the imaginary is primarily 
due to the need to identify with something external, other, different, in order to acquire 
the basis of a self-uniﬁ ed identity” (ibid., p. 18). In that sense, every purely imaginary 
equilibrium or balance with the other is always marked by an element of difference 
which subverts the whole idea of a stable reconciled subjectivity based on the concep-
tion of the autonomous ego. 
If the imaginary representation of ourselves, the mirror image, is incapable of pro-
viding us with a stable identity, the only option left for acquiring one seems to be in the 
ﬁ eld of linguistic representation, the symbolic register. As Lacan argues, the symbolic 
is already presupposed in the functioning of the mirror. The passage from the imaginary 
to the symbolical order is a theoretical abstraction pointing to a certain logical and not 
strictly speaking chronological order. From the time of its birth, and even before that, 
the infant is inserted into a symbolic network constructed by its parents and family. The 
infant’s name is sometimes chosen before it is born and its life is interwoven, in the par-
ents’ imagination, with a pre-existing family mythology. This whole framework, while 
the new-born is not aware of it, is destined to inﬂ uence its psychic development. Even 
the images with which we identify in the mirror stage derive from how our parents see 
us (thus being symbolically sanctioned) and are linguistically structured. Lacan explicit-
ly points out that the articulation of the subject to the imaginary and the symbolic Other 
do not exist separately. What changes though, is the power with which they inﬂ uence us. 
While the image equally plays a capital role in our domain [a role dominant, although 
not absolute, during the mirror stage], this role is completely taken up and caught up 
within, remoulded and reanimated by, the symbolic order. “If the ego emerges in the 
imaginary, the subject emerges in the symbolic” as Stavrakakis comments (ibid., p. 19).
In this context Lacan’s statements such as: “the subject is the subject of the signi-
ﬁ er – determined by it”, “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject”, 
“the signiﬁ er is pre-eminent over the subject” gain clarity. The Lacanian understanding 
of the notions of the “signiﬁ er” or “language” is strongly connected with de Saussurian 
theory of the sign which I outlined earlier. Noteworthy though, is that the Lacanian 
conception of the relation between the signiﬁ er and the signiﬁ ed transcends de Saus-
sure’s alleged “representationism” (the conception whereby the signiﬁ ed is rendered 
the paramount importance in the process of the construction of meaning) and thus con-
curs with the post-structuralist critique of de Saussure. In question here is precisely the 
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isomorphism retained by de Saussure. Lacan is clear from the beginning that there is 
no isomorphism between the two domains, that of the signiﬁ er and that of the signi-
ﬁ ed. Their relation is not a relationship of two equivalent levels. According to Lacan, 
if no natural bond exists between the signiﬁ er and the signiﬁ ed, then it follows that the 
signiﬁ ed belongs to the sphere of that which is non-linguistic, that is – to the real. The 
signiﬁ er is only attributed a role of a transient vehicle of meaning. 
Thus in Lacan’s theory it is the signiﬁ er that receives the primordial position in the 
process of signiﬁ cation which he presents with an algorithm S/s. 
Here, the signiﬁ er (S) is located over the signiﬁ ed (s), this ‘over’ corresponding to 
the bar separating them, a barrier resisting signiﬁ cation. This barrier is exactly 
what makes possible an exact study of the connections proper to the signiﬁ er, and of 
the extent of their function in the genesis of the signiﬁ ed. If the dominant factor here 
is the bar which disrupts the unity of the Saussurean sign, then the unity of signiﬁ ca-
tion can only be an illusion. What creates this illusion (the effect of the signiﬁ ed) is 
the play of the signiﬁ ers: the signiﬁ er alone guarantees the theoretical coherence of 
the whole as a whole (ibid., pp. 24-25). 
In Lacan’s scheme then, meaning is the product of the signiﬁ er and not the reverse2. 
What the signiﬁ er represents is only “the presence of difference”, rendering impossible 
any connection between signs and things. The signiﬁ ed thus becomes, as Lacan once 
put it, the “result of a transference”. We speak about it only because it is convenient 
for us to believe in it. The world of signiﬁ eds is none other than that of language where 
the signiﬁ ed is never to become a full presence constituted outside language. Every act 
of signiﬁ cation only refers to another act of signiﬁ cation. Signiﬁ ers refer only to other 
signiﬁ ers. In this way the signiﬁ ed simply disappears. It vanishes because it is no longer 
associated with the concept, as in de Saussure (see Marini 1992, p. 51), but is conceived 
as belonging to the order of the real; that is why the bar dividing signiﬁ er and signiﬁ ed, 
instead of constituting an intimate link between them, instead of creating the unity of 
the sign, is understood as a barrier resisting signiﬁ cation, as a limit marking the inter-
section of the symbolic with the real (Boothby 1991, p. 127). 
Lacan accepts from the beginning what de Saussure denied but was forced to intro-
duce indirectly into his work In Lacan, however, this relation between the signiﬁ ed and 
the real is accepted but then only to be located at the limit of signiﬁ cation and not at 
its kernel. The signiﬁ ed disappears as such, that is to say as the epicentre of signiﬁ ca-
tion, exactly because it belongs to the real dimension situated beyond the level of the 
symbolic. The locus of the signiﬁ ed is retained and is now designated by a “constitutive 
lack”. This locus is empty, although it surely exists since the subject does not cease to 
2  To illustrate this thesis Lacan uses the famous example of toilet doors. The ladies’ and the gentle-
men’s toilets in themselves are signiﬁ eds treated as an external reality. In this sense they do not differ. Two 
doors exactly the same lead to exactly the same rooms. The difference in meaning is only produced by the 
signifying element – the signs on the doors.
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grasp the lost and impossible signiﬁ er in ever new – though still illusory in their being 
the effects of the play of signiﬁ ers – attempts. One is led to conclude that the signiﬁ ed 
indeed belongs both to the order of the imgainary and to the order of the real. “Ac-
cording to Lacan, the signiﬁ ed, what is supposed to be, through its links to external 
reality, the source of signiﬁ cation, indeed belongs to the real. But this is a real that 
resists symbolisation – this is the deﬁ nition of the real in Lacan; the real is what cannot 
be symbolised, the impossible. Surely, if this real is always absent from the level of 
signiﬁ cation it cannot be in itself and by itself the source of this same signiﬁ cation. Its 
absence however, the constitutive lack of the signiﬁ ed as real, can” (Stavrakakis 1999, 
p. 27). What emerges in this way is the signiﬁ ed transferred to its imaginary dimension. 
There is, however, the third dimension to this signifying play, one that governs it. It is 
the symbolic – the dimension that Lacan attributes the decisive role to. 
On the discoursive level these considerations have crucial consequences for the 
theory of the subject. The fullness of the identity that the subject is seeking is not pos-
sible, according to Lacan, neither at the symbolic nor at the imaginary level. Every 
process of symbolization introduces with it the “constitutive lack” of the signiﬁ ed and 
thus dooms the subject to the ceaseless symbolization in the Other in search for his/her 
true identity. Thus in Lacan we should rather speak of the inﬁ nity of “identiﬁ cations” 
and not of the subject’s identity, it being an impossible condition. 
Symbolisation, that is to say the pursuit of identity itself, introduces lack and makes 
identity ultimately impossible. For even the idea of identity to become possible its 
ultimate impossibility has to be instituted. Identity is possible only as a failed iden-
tity; it remains desirable exactly because it is essentially impossible. It is this con-
stitutive impossibility that, by making full identity impossible, makes identiﬁ cation 
possible, if not necessary. Thus, it is rather misleading to speak of identities within 
a Lacanian framework. What we have is only attempts to construct a stable identity, 
either on the imaginary or the symbolic level, through the image or the signiﬁ er. The 
subject of lack emerges due to the failure of all these attempts. What we have then, 
if we want to be precise and accurate, is not identities but identiﬁ cations, a series of 
failed identiﬁ cations or rather a play between identiﬁ cation and its failure, a deeply 
political play (ibid., p. 29).
Foucault: the discursive and non-discursive
Many of the themes outlined above are present in Michel Foucault’s theory of dis-
course (the relation of subject and discourse, the problem of the unity of structure/dis-
course). Its speciﬁ city consists however in the delimitation of the sphere of discourse 
and the social sphere as two distinct domains which inﬂ uence one another retaining at 
the same time certain autonomy.
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Foucault deﬁ nes the subject of his investigations as “an area of discursive events 
which constitutes a discursive formation”. Two things need to be emphasized here: 
Foucault stresses the historicity of the discursive conﬁ gurations, discourse being for 
him a certain historical a priori, and his vision of history is contrary to the traditional 
approach based on the idea of a long duration allowing a historian to depict grand po-
litical events and persons and indicate long causative chains. Primarily he is interested 
in “a pure description of the facts of discourse”, composed of the sum of “all the real 
statements (spoken or written) in their eventual dispersion and in the instance that is 
speciﬁ c to each of them” (Foucault 1968, p. 16). The basic unit is for Foucault a “state-
ment” (l’énoncé) which in The Archeology of Knowledge is deﬁ ned as “a function of 
realization of the verbal performance” (Foucault 2005, p. 228).
What Foucault wants to emphasize is that everything a “statement” offers to read is 
in a way “outside” – there are not hermeneutical senses or notions whose comprehension 
we can gain if we follow the procedures of Verstehen. Foucault treats the statement as an 
event which is to suggest that it is something material, empirical, and also something that 
evades traditional historical durations. The ﬁ eld of discourse consists thus of dispersed 
statements-events having their own speciﬁ city and entering mutual relations. The ar-
cheological analysis searches among these clusters of statements for “a similar system of 
dispersion”, for certain regularities between statements allowing the description of what 
Foucault calls “systems of formation”. A discursive formation is a system of coexistence 
and mutual inﬂ uence of heterogenic elements: institutions, techniques, social groups, 
relations between discourses that are ﬁ nally formed by the “discursive practice”.
The discursive formation is not to be identiﬁ ed with a given science or “hardly sci-
entiﬁ zed disciplines” or, contrary to this, with the forms that exlude any scientiﬁ city. 
The relations that govern it are certainly less strict than in science but this does not mean 
that they are simply gatherings of heterogenous masses of information derived from 
multiple domains, experiences and traditions. One can say that archeology describes 
the intermediate level between the everyday non-discursive practices and formalized 
disciplines which Foucault calls knowledge. The elements of the discursive formation 
“are that on the basis of which coherent (or incoherent) propositions are built up, more 
or less exact descriptions developed, veriﬁ cations carried out, theories deployed. They 
form the precondition of what is later revealed as and which later functions as an item 
of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error” (ibid., p. 200). 
Knowledge is thus understood as a group of elements, formed in a regular manner 
by a discursive practice which are the basis for the constitution of a science. It does not 
only include demonstrations but also ﬁ ctions, reﬂ ections, relations, institutional regula-
tions and political decisions. Archeology enables one to capture the moment in which 
science only begins to take form, when there exists no exact rules for the selection of 
statements, when different contents are mixed together under no rigor of truth: archeol-
ogy allows a description of “immature sciences”3. 
3  The term introduced by Ian Hacking (1991).
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Under the category of immature sciences fall, according to Foucualt, the human sci-
ences4 which are for him the working material that serves the purpose of showing the 
effectiveness of the archeological method. A successful archeological investigation de-
pends on whether the archeologist has managed to describe and analyse a given domain 
as an autonomous realm free of common sense beliefs. If we bracket the truth and the 
meaning of the statements that comprise this domain, we will not be able to systematize 
with the use of traditional means focusing for example on the intellectual processes in 
the minds of great scientists or on a science’s progress in search of truth. None of these 
means, Foucault argues, withstands the test of time. In no discipline is it possible to 
point to one, distinctive feature that has remained unchanged in the course of transfor-
mations and changes which occur in it. Consequently, Foucault has to offer a new way 
of describing, one that does not deform the discourse by empirical or transcendental 
analyses. In order to resolve this problem, he comes up with four categories on which 
analysis of the discursive formations is to focus. These are: object, subject, concept, 
and strategy. In the concluding fragment of Réponse au Cercle d’épistemologie Fou-
cault states that 
there exist four criteria that allow the recognition of the discursive units but are not 
at the same time traditional units (such as text, work, science, domain or form of dis-
course, the terms applied within it and the choices thus revealed). These four criteria 
are not only coalescent with each other but they constitute one another: the ﬁ rst one 
determines the unity of a discourse through the rule that governs the formation of 
all its objects; the second one through the rule that governs the formation of all its 
syntactic types; the third one through the rule that governs the formation of all its 
semantic elements; and the fourth one through the rule that governs the formation 
of all its operational possibilities. In this way all these aspects of discourse overlap. 
And when in a given group of statements one can mark and describe a referential 
system (un référentiel), a certain type of arrangement of statements, a certain theo-
retical net, a certain ﬁ eld of strategic possibilities, one can be sure that they belong 
to something that can be called the discursive formation (Foucault 1968, p. 29).
The major role in the constitution of a discursive formation is played, according to 
Foucualt, by a “discursive practice”. By this Foucault means “a body of autonomous, 
historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have deﬁ ned a given 
period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the condii-
tons of operation of the ununciative function” (Foucault 2005, p. 131). Apart from the 
rules (practices) speciﬁ c only for discourse Foucault distinguishes also a set of other 
4  It is important to remember that Foucault understands this term unconventionally including (in The 
Order of Things) in the human sciences, biology and economics. Here Foucault has in mind what is gener-
ally understood as disciplines that make human beings and the social manifestations of their lives – their 
“doubles” – such as life (studied by biology) and work (studied by economics) the object of their study. 
In this sense we can say that other disciplines that Foucault was interested in: psychology, penology and 
medicine can also be conceived of as human sciences.
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inﬂ uences forming statements that a discursive formation consists of. He writes about 
the relations that discourse enters with the non-discursive elements and emphasizes 
their relevance5. He speciﬁ es the primary relations that can be determined indepen-
dently on every discourse or object of discourse that take place between institutions, 
techniques, social forms, etc. and the secondary relations which can be located in the 
discourse itself and encountered in the ways in which the acting subjects determine 
their own behavior. It is however the most illusive and misleading point in his theory. 
Indeed the relations connected with the non-discursive play a subsidiary role when 
compared to the discursive relations6: 
when one speaks of a system of formation, one does not only mean the juxtaposition, 
coexistence or interaction of heterogenous elements (institutions, techniques, social 
gropus, perceptual organizations, relations between various discourses), but also 
the relation that is established between them – and in a well determined form – by 
discursive practice7 (ibid., pp. 80-81). 
As Dreyfus and Rabinow have argued, the thesis on the primacy of discursive prac-
tices over other components of the discursive formation – “composing them into re-
lations” as Foucault states – is one of the most important, although seldom noticed, 
themes of The Archeology of Knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983, p. 63). If dis-
course has its own, distinct rules that determine the shape, object and choice of the 
thematics of the statement and also who and from what viewpoint they are formed, 
then Foucault’s discursive formation becomes not only independent on the rules of lan-
guage or logic, but consequently it escapes subordination to the non-discursive reality. 
Now, it is obvious that such an approach may raise many doubts. One may ask how the 
5  In Réponse à une question Foucault distinguishes three main criteria that individualize the discourse: 
formation, transformation and threshold, and correlation. The criterion of correlation consists in “deﬁ ning 
the set of relations which deﬁ ne and situate it [a given type of discourse, in this case medical discourse – 
L. R.] among other types of discourse (such as biology, chemistry, political theory or the analysis of the 
society) and in the non-discursive context in which it functions (institutions, social relations, economic and 
political situation)” (Foucault 1994, p. 676). In the same article Foucault emphasizes that “what is impor-
tant to me above all is to deﬁ ne the play of dependencies between all these transformations: a) intradiscur-
sive dependencies (between the objects, operations and concepts of a single formation); b) interdiscursive 
dependencies (between different discursive formations (…)); c) extradiscursive dependencies (between 
discursive transformations and transformations outside of discourse, for example: the correlations studied 
in Madness and Civilization and Birth of the Clinic between medical discourse and a whole play of eco-
nomic, political and social changes” (ibid., p. 680). 
6  The discursive relations are, in a “sense, at the limit of discourse: they offer it objects of which it can 
speak, or rather (…) determine the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this 
or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, analyze them, classify them, explain them, etc. These 
relations characterize not the language used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, 
but discourse itself as a practice” (Foucault 2005, pp. 50-51). 
7  Foucault states that the discursive relations are neither objective nor subjective and “the autonomy 
of discourse and its speciﬁ city do not give it the status of pure ideality and total historical independence” 
(Foucault 2005, p. 182).
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non-discursive relations are to inﬂ uence the discursive ones maintaining at the same 
time relative autonomy of the letter? In what way do they unite into one discursive for-
mation, if they are subject to the discursive practice? Should we not consider discourse 
to be a certain common ground on which one can analyze the social? And if so, would 
it not lead to the necessity of renouncing the division into the discursive and the non-
discursive? Following this lead, we would take a position quite similar to that of some 
post-structuralist thinkers (especially that of Laclau’s). On the one hand, many claims 
by Foucault encourage us to follow this way, since it is discourse, as he envisions it, 
that unites the whole system of practices and it is only on the grounds of the unity it 
produces that disparate political, social and economical factors can converge and func-
tion. On the other hand, Foucault thinks the society to be something more then only dis-
course which is evidenced in his particular interest in primary and secondary relations. 
In Réponse à une question Foucault speaks of their “direct relations” with discourse: 
If indeed there is a link between medical practice and political discourse, it is not, 
it seems to me, because this pracitice ﬁ rst changed men’s consciousness, their way 
of perceiving things or conceiving of the world, and then ﬁ nally the form of their 
knowledge and its content; nor is it because it was initially reﬂ ected, in a more or 
less clear and systematic manner, in concepts, notions or themes which were sub-
sequently imported into medicine. The link is much more direct: political practice 
did not transform the meaning or form of medical discourse, but the conditions of 
its emergence and functioning; it transformed the mode of existence of medical 
discourse (Foucault 1994, pp. 689-690).
Therefore, the extradiscursive contributes signiﬁ cantly to the discursive. Why then 
emphasize the autonomy and speciﬁ city of discursive relations that are to decide upon 
the form of a discursive formation? Foucault does not provide a satisfactory answer 
to this question. This point in his theory to the present day remains a major difﬁ culty 
for his interpreters. In the end one is led to conclude that the “system of formation” in 
which both the truth and the meaning of a statement are “bracketed” becomes merely 
an abstract creation suspended in a vacuum, which brings us back to the solution pro-
posed by structuralists. Foucault’s structuralism consists in isolating and objectifying 
a given domain of theoretical investigations and in a way attribute to it full legitimacy. 
If in structuralism this domain was anticipated for language, for Foucault it will be 
discourse, even though his whole theoretical framework was aimed at showing the 
distinctness of the phenomenon of discourse from the linguisitic system8.
Translated from Polish by Wojciech Kruszelnicki
8  All the methodological difﬁ culties resulting from the idea of archeology are instructively described 
by Dreyfuss and Rabinow (1983) in the chapter The Methodological Failure of Archeology.
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